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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: 
/ 
SERGE B. GUDMUNDSON, 
Disciplinary Proceeding/ / Case No. 
13620 
Petitioner. / 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
' STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action wherein a Complaint was 
filed with the Board of Commissioners of the 
Utah State Bar by a Screening Committee of the 
Utah State Bar, alleging that the Petitioner, 
who is an attorney and coxinselor at law of the 
State of Utah and a member of the Utah State 
Bar, allegedly conducted himself in an unpro-
fessional manner as charged in the Complaint 
of the Screening Committee of the Utah State 
Bar. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Board of Commissioners of the Utah 
State Bar made a finding of fact, alleging the 
violation of certain Canons of ethics by the 
Petitioner and made a recommendation that the 
Petitioner be suspended from the practice of 
law for a period of one (1) year. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PETITIONER 
The Petitioner seeks reversal of the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and decision 
rendered by the Bar Commission/ and seeks to 
establish before the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, that the conclusions of the Bar 
Commission are in error and that the decision 
and recommendation for disciplining the 
Petitioner is not proper under the existing 
facts and law and is a harsh and unwarranted 
recommendation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Petitioner is an attorney and counselor 
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of the State of Utah and a member of the Utah 
State Bar, having graduated from the University 
of Utah School of Law in 1950; having been 
admitted to the practice of law in the State 
of Utah in 1951; and having offices at 217 
Eccles Building, in Ogden, Utah. (R-14) 
The Complaint of the Bar set forth as a 
first count an allegation concerning one, 
Velma Joy Beck, an alleged violation of Rule III, 
Canon 6, DR 6-101(A)(3); Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(2) 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the 
Utah State Bar, alleging that the said Velma 
Beck employed the Petitioner in August of 1972 
to obtain a Decree of Divorce for her and paid 
a sum of money to the Petitioner, alleging the 
failure of the Petitioner in expeditiously 
handling the matter for said client and by 
the failing in repayment to the client of a 
portion of the fee in connection therewith. (R-2) 
The original Complaint of the Bar alleged as 
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a second count, that the Petitioner was 
employed by Gregory W. Green to represent 
Green in an action, and with the failure of 
the Petitioner after termination of his 
services to refund to the client the fees paid, 
and in doing so alleged in the original Complair 
violation of Rule III, Canon 6, PR 6-101(A)(3); 
Canon 7, PR 7-101 (A) (2); and Canon 9, PR 9-101 
CB)(4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar. (R-3) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PUE PROCESS REQUIRES TIMELY NOTICE. 
In the allegations set forth in the Complaini 
of the Bar regarding the conduct of the 
Petitioner in his relationship to Gregory W. 
Green, it is interesting to note that not until 
the time of the hearing itself was the Petition* 
actually advised of the charges against him. 
(TR-4) The Board of Bar Commissioners found 
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the Green matter. The Board of the Bar 
Commission having amended the Complaint on 
the day of the hearing (TR-4) and proceeding 
to a hearing on the amended Complaint in 
spite of the objection by the Petitioner to 
a continuation of the hearing on the amended 
Complaint. (TR-37) 
The Petitioner was denied an opportunity 
to prepare an adequate defense and to have a 
meaningful Due Process hearing by reason of 
the failure of the Complaint to set forth the 
actual Canon which the Bar alleged was violated 
by the Petitioner. The Bar having found no 
violation by the Petitioner as to the other 
two Canons allegedly violated by the Petitioner 
in the Green matter. (R-18) 
The record before the Bar will reveal that 
the Petitioner was greatly disturbed by the 
fact that there was to be a full hearing in 
the matter as to Gregory Green, in that the 
-6-
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Petitioner alleges that in his appearance 
before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar, 
Petitioner alleged (TR-3) that he was at a 
disadvantage, in that it was his belief that 
there was no charge as to Green, in that he 
had been advised by the Screening Committee 
that if the matter was settled to the satisfac-
tion of the client, that there would be a 
dismissal of the action, and that as a result 
thereof, the Petitioner did not even bring his 
file and records in the matter to the Bar 
Commission hearing. (TR-3) 
The record before this Court shows that the 
father of Gregory Green, who had paid the fee 
to the Petitioner on behalf of his son, Gregory 
Green, had been a friend and client of the 
Petitioner for many years. (TR-53) The record 
further reveals that the Petitioner had rendered 
many services without charge to both the 
Complainant, Gregory Green, and to his father, 
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who had paid the money on behalf of his son, 
Gregory. That there had been a lack of 
mutuality of payment by the Greens to the 
Petitioner and that in retaining part of the 
monies, the Petitioner felt in his own mind, 
that he was justified in being paid for the 
services of representing both the son in the 
hearings previous to the Petitioner being 
retained for the purpose of filing a suit on 
behalf of the son, Gregory Green, and the many 
previous services rendered by the Petitioner 
on behalf of the father of Gregory Green, and 
it is evident from a reading of the Transcript 
of the trauma of the Petitioner in finding his 
being charged with the alleged retention of 
unearned funds, in that in the Petitioner's 
own mind in his testimony before the Commission 
of the Bar, was evidenced that his feelings 
were that he had rendered many services and 
was merely retaining some of the funds for 
-8-
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which he had an offset of fees from previous 
services rendered. (TR-47,-48,-49,-51,-52) 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, 
that the Petitioner was unable to be prepared 
to answer any charges as alleged in the second 
count in relationship to Gregory Green, in 
that: 
1. Petitioner had been led to believe that 
there would be no hearing as to that matter, 
in that there had been an Accord and Satis-
faction between the parties in settlement of 
any monies owed by the Petitioner to the client, 
and (TR-3, Pl.Exh.10) 
2. That the notice in the Complaint served 
upon the Petitioner set forth a Canon, namely 
Canon 9, DR 9-101(B) (4), which is a non-existent 
Canon and could not in any way inform and 
advise the Petitioner as to the charge against 
him prior to the time of the hearing, and (R-2) 
3. The Petitioner did not bring his file 
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and the records and evidence which would have 
been in mitigation of the charge against him as 
to the Canon with which the Bar Commission founc 
a violation, namely Canon 9, PR 9-102(b)(4), 
based upon Petitioner's belief that there was 
to be no hearing as to that matter and that the 
Complaint was faulty in setting forth the 
charge. (TR-31 
POINT II 
VIOLATION OF CANON REQUIRES INTENT. 
In regards to the allegations set forth as 
to the Complaint of Velma Joy Beck James/ here-
inafter referred to as Beck, it was evidenced 
that in the first instance the Complainant had 
been a previous client of the Petitioner in a 
prior divorce action. The Complainant moved 
back to Utah from California and again retained 
the Petitioner in August, 1972, in an attempt 
to attain a property settlement and divorce 
.from her successive spouse who resided in 
-10-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
California. (TR-7) 
The Complainant, Beck, was advised that she 
would not be eligible for an action in divorce 
until after she had established residence in 
Utah for a period of three months, paying to 
the Petitioner the sum of $25.00 as a retainer 
for the filing fees of the divorce. (TR-7,-8) 
The Complainant further advised the Petitioner, 
that she was a 40-percent owner in a business 
that she was engaged in with her husband in 
California CTR-13), and that she wanted 
one-half of the business as part of the divorce 
settlement. 
The Petitioner advised Beck that there was 
no jurisdiction in a Utah divorce action for 
obtaining a personal property settlement from 
her husband and that Petitioner would make 
an attempt to see if the husband was willing 
to make a property settlement for a divorce. 
(TR-13,-141 
-11-
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The Petitioner, after a couple of telephone 
calls with the spouse of Beck, determined that 
the husband was threatening to file an attempted 
murder charge against Beck if she should attempt 
to obtain a California divorce, and the 
Petitioner made telephone calls and communicatee 
with the husband in an attempt to arrive at a 
settlement without the necessity of going 
through a Utah divorce action wherein the 
Complainant would not be compensated. (TR-13,-1' 
Beck admitted that she received a telephone 
call from her husband after communications from 
the Petitioner and that her husband had told 
her to "drop dead". (TR-7) 
Beck paid the Petitioner an additional 
$50.00 on November 7, 1972; $75.00 on November 
and $175.00 on February 5, 1973. (Ex.1,2,3,4) 
The Petitioner was attempting during this 
period of time to engage in a telephone conver-
sation and letter writing ploy with the spouse 
-12-
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of the Complainant in an attempt to better the 
position of his client, Beck, Two days prior 
to the Complainant receiving the notice of 
her husband having obtained a divorce from 
her in the California Courts, the Petitioner 
recommended that they file a publication to 
get jurisdiction over the husband, and obviously 
was unable to file same prior to the time of 
obtaining the notice from the husband of his 
attaining of a divorce. (TR-14,-15) 
It is also interesting to note that the 
Complainant did not ask for the discharge of 
her attorney until after she had written a 
letter to the Grievance Committee of the Bar, 
being sure to make a copy of same demanding a 
refund of fees paid as a self-serving record 
to bolster her claim to the Bar. (TR-15,-19) 
The record further shows that the Complainant 
was more interested in getting a divorce with 
or without a property settlement, in that she 
-13-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
became married immediately after the obtaining 
of a divorce by her husband, and as the record 
shows, she has added the last name of "James" 
to her previous names• (TR-19) 
The Complainant testified and admitted, 
that her first plan in discussing the divorce 
with the Petitioner was in forcing her husband 
into getting a divorce and settling the action 
by a California divorce. (TR-21) In accordance 
with the belief of the Petitioner, the fee 
paid to him was for the negotiations, letter 
writing, and telephone conversations, in 
addition to the filing of a Complaint, all in 
line with the coercive attempt by Counsel to 
compel the husband to obtain the divorce in 
California. (TR-21,-22) 
The record further reveals that the Petitions 
had previously performed legal services for 
Beck and that they had a good relationship, 
and further, that the Petitioner did not always 
-14-
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bill the Complainant for services which he 
rendered for her. (TR-22) 
The Petitioner believed that the fee of 
$300.00, plus the filing fee, was for services 
to be rendered to the Complainant in compelling 
the obtaining of a California Decree and not 
necessarily in obtaining a Utah Decree with 
the hope of attempting to coerce a property 
settlement of some kind as to the spouse of 
the Complainant. (TR-22) 
It is further submitted to this Honorable 
Court, that on TR-30 of Record the Petitioner 
was given an opportunity to file a Brief in 
supplementation of the record as to the law 
in regards to the subject matter before the 
Bar Commission, which the Petitioner did 
submit to the Bar on December 17, 1973, but 
that nowhere in the record has there been an 
inclusion of the Brief and certified statement 
for the record made by the Petitioner. 
-15-
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POINT III 
DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEY SHOULD NOT BE 
PUNITIVE. 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, 
that the suspension, revocation, or disbarment 
of an attorney at law is not a matter to be 
taken lightly, for as Chief Justice John Marshal 
stated in Ex Parte Burr 6 Law Edition 153: 
"On the one hand, the profession 
of an attorney is of great importance 
to an individual, the prosperity of 
his whole life may depend upon its 
exercise* The right to exercise it 
is not to be lightly or capriciously 
taken from him." 
This Court has previously held in Carter 
Oil Company vs. State, 240 P.2d 787, that Boards 
of quasi judicial powers must base their find-
ings and orders on substantial evidence. 
While the Petitioner would not impugn the 
motives and work performed by members of the 
Bar Commission in the performance of this 
function, it should always be borne in mind 
-16-
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as was stated in Geer vs. Stathopulos, 390 
P.2d 606y Supreme Court of Colorado: 
"That capricious or arbitrary exercise 
of discretion by an administrative 
board can arise, by exercise of its 
discretion in such manner after a 
consideration of evidence before it, 
has clearly indicated that its action 
is based on conclusions from the 
evidence such that reasonable men 
fairly and honestly considering the 
evidence must reach contrary conclusions." 
The Colorado Supreme Court further stated, 
the abiding and well based principle, that 
when a Court is called upon to review action 
of an administrative agency, it should be placed 
in the same position as such agency, and there-
fore, if the agency has some knowledge of some 
fact, and acts upon such knowledge, it should 
see to it that what it knows becomes part of 
the record in order to permit the reviewing 
Court to evaluate the matter so known. It is 
submitted to this Honorable Court, that in 
the instant matter before the Court, the record 
is so incomplete and so inconclusive as to 
-17-
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make difficult the task of this Honorable 
Court to make a fair ascertainment of what 
would be a just action in the matter it is 
now considering. 
It is submitted to this Court, that the 
principle of law set forth in Marks vs. France, 
325 P.2d 368, may be applicable in the instant 
situation where the Court stated that an 
administrative body, such as the Board of 
Examiners in Optometry, cannot be the final 
judge of reasonableness of its orders, and 
while Courts will not be permitted to substitut 
their Judgment for that of administrative 
bodies, nevertheless Courts are definitely 
charged with the solemn duty of determining 
whether the procedure employed in reaching 
Judgment, or whether Judgment itself as rendere 
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or oppresive under 
circumstances of each particular case. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the State 
-18-
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of Oklahoma Bar Association vs. Booth, 441 
P.2d 405, (1966), used as a goal for the 
purposes of the action of a Bar Commission, 
that it did not have as the ultimate purpose 
the disciplining of an attorney in order to 
inflict punishment, but that the purpose was 
purely purification of the Bar and protection 
of the Courts and public generally. 
The Court stated in the Bar Association of 
San Francisco vs. Sullivan, 198 P. 7, that 
in making a determination of unprofessional 
conduct as to an attorney, that all reasonable 
doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused 
and where there are two or more reasonable 
inferences may be drawn from a proved fact, 
that, that inference leading to a conclusion 
of innocence rather than one leading to a 
conclusion of guilt will be accepted. 
It is further submitted to this Honorable 
Court, that the attorney before the Bar should 
-19-
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be disciplined only for a wilful breach of 
the rules of professional conduct, and that 
to establish a wilful breach, it should be 
demonstrated that the person charged, acted 
or omitted to act purposely, that he knew 
what he was doing or not doing, and that he 
intended either to commit the act or to abstain 
from committing it, and this principle of law 
has been well established in the cases of 
Palmquist vs» State Bar, 43 Cal.2d 428; In 
Re Trombley, 193 P.2d 734; Towle vs. Matheus, 
62 P. 1064, 
The Supreme Court of Arizona in Talbot vs. 
Schroeder, 475 P.2d 520, held that an attorney 
is bound to discharge his duties to his client 
with strictest fidelity and to observe the 
highest and the utmost good faith, but that 
at the same time, an attorney is not liable 
to a client when acting in good faith, when 
he makes mere errors of judgment, or for a 
-20-
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mistake as to an unsettled issue of law. It 
was further held in Eadun vs. Reuler, 146 Col. 
347, 361 P.2d 445, (1961), that an attorney 
is not liable simply because his client becomes 
unhappy with the result. 
CONCLUSION 
It is, therefore, submitted to this Honorable 
Court that in the matter of the single count, 
Re Gregory Green, for which the Petitioner was 
held to be in violation of a specific Canon, 
that he was not advised of that specific Canon 
nor could he defend himself against it until 
at the time of the actual hearing, in that the 
Canon cited in the Complaint was unknown to 
the Petitioner until the time of the hearing 
and was a non-existent Canon and one for which 
he could find no rule in any book setting 
forth the Canons of ethics of the Bar of the 
State of Utah; and that in the case of the 
matter of Beck, that there is some indication 
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of the vindictiveness of a client, who perhaps 
through her own penuriousness, sought to gain 
an advantage by a refund of funds which had 
been well earned by the attorney, or at least, 
in his opinion, believed he had so earned it. 
Further, that the recommendation of the 
Commission of the Bar is far in excess of any 
punishment warranted to a man of long standing 
and good character who has been a faithful 
member of the Bar of this State for more than 
23 years in which he has held forth as a 
practicing attorney. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETE N. VLAHOS of 
VLAHOS & GALE 
Suite 312 Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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A copy of the above and foregoing Brief 
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